2026-08-03 19:50 UTC
Replies (1)
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@flyingpenguin@infosec.exchange 2026-08-03 20:59
@lorenzofb@infosec.exchange I'm gonna have to agree with the "no brainer". Disabled brakes on a car plus nobody monitoring the road is the most simple duty-of-care failure. Call it common-law negligence plus trespass. This isn't even Rylands v. Fletcher (liability is on those who bring a hazardous thing onto their land and let it escape, regardless of care taken). This is more like Jurassic Park. This is turning off the guardrails and provisioning egress, which is the behavior of risk creation, not even a risk containment failure. You cannot design a study around whether the Velociraptor can open doors, leave the doors open, and then argue the escape was novel, let alone unforeseeable. In all my interviews with the press last week I said Grover Shoe Factory 1905 is the real world precedent. It's what I've been teaching my CS students about AI/ML/BigData ethics for a decade already. Massachusetts passed boiler inspection law in 1907, ASME convened its code committee in 1911, the Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code arrived in 1914-15, and states adopted it as the condition of operation. Self-certified pressure vessels ended as a legal category, because of the Grover Shoe Factory disaster. Nobody after that asked the boiler manufacturer whether its boiler was safe; an independent inspector signed or the thing did not run. This isn't actually hard. It's corporate malfeasance prevention. No agentic deployment runs without independent certification of its containment and monitoring, per system, renewable, with the certificate as the condition of operation. We know how to do it. We know why to do it. We just need someone with the authority.