@moldy_rice@piefed.keyboardvagabond.com
2026-10-24 17:46 UTC
You’re talking about publishing infrastructure compromise
Compromise of the integrity of the traffic between your server and theirs can happen. Loads of CAs have been compromised. X.509 root stores insecurity breaks https.
That’s why most package managers have signatures. And most hardened servers use Tor to fetch packages, to mitigate targeted attacks like indefinite freeze
Replies (1)
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@hperrin@lemmy.ca 2026-10-24 19:29
I feel like your threat model is not realistic. It is way more likely that you will be running malicious and/or vulnerable code that was packaged appropriately by the actual package maintainer than for a CA compromise to allow an attacker to inject a malicious package during a MITM attack while retrieving an OCI image from a container repository. Like, yes, you shouldn’t 100% trust your ISP or your DNS server, but if you’re that paranoid, you shouldn’t trust your distro’s repository either. You should be building everything from source.